After nearly two months of internal deliberations, President Joe Biden finally authorized Ukraine to use long-range ATACMS missile systems against Russian targets on Nov. 17. This decision followed Russia’s massing of approximately 50,000 troops to reclaim the Kursk region, which Ukraine had taken earlier in the year.
Among the Russian forces were about 10,000 North Korean soldiers, likely the first wave of a much larger North Korean contingent set to join the Russian military. In addition to the ATACMS, Biden’s authorization allowed Ukraine to deploy the British-made Storm Shadow missiles and France’s Scalp missiles, both of which contain U.S.-made navigation systems.
These systems, subject to American usage restrictions, have a range of approximately 300 miles, similar to the ATACMS, which comes in variants ranging from 185 to 375 miles. All three missile types can strike deep into Russian territory.
Putin updates Russia’s nuclear doctrine, framing NATO support for Ukraine as a declaration of war
Within two days of receiving approval, Ukraine fired as many as eight ATACMS at a weapons depot near Karachev, a town in Russia’s Bryansk region, located 70 miles from the border and 250 miles from Moscow.
The following day, Ukrainian Sukhoi bombers launched 10 British Storm Shadow missiles targeting an underground Russian command post in Martino, located 25 miles from the border in Kursk. This facility reportedly housed Russian and possibly North Korean commanders.
On the same day Ukraine launched the ATACMS, President Vladimir Putin officially signed an update to Russia’s nuclear doctrine. This change, previously hinted at two months earlier when Biden was rumored to be considering the ATACMS release, emphasizes that supplying long-range missiles to Ukraine would effectively involve NATO directly in the conflict.
Putin framed the situation as a declaration of war against Russia by NATO countries, including the U.S. and European nations. The updated doctrine stipulates that any aggression against Russia or its allies, supported by a nuclear power, could be met with nuclear retaliation.
Additionally, the document asserts that nuclear weapons could be used to counter conventional threats to Russian sovereignty or territorial integrity, marking a shift from the previous 2020 version. Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons against Russian territory, including its attacks in the Kursk region, aligns with Russia’s new nuclear doctrine criteria.
Even so, Moscow has not resorted to nuclear escalation despite Ukraine’s use of shorter-range Western weapons, like the Small Diameter Bombs launched from HIMARS, which Washington supplied in early 2023. These strikes, particularly in Crimea—a region Russia considers its own—have not triggered a nuclear response.
Putin’s rhetoric on the potential use of nuclear weapons has been consistent since the early months of the invasion. In September 2022, he made a statement suggesting Russia would employ any means necessary to defend its territorial integrity, signaling an eventual update to the nuclear doctrine.
However, despite these declarations, the decision to use nuclear weapons has always rested with Putin, and so far, he has refrained from such actions, even as the U.S. has escalated its support for Ukraine, providing HIMARS, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and eventually F-16 fighter aircraft.
Biden’s decision to approve the ATACMS for Ukraine could signal a shift in U.S. policy, where, despite Putin’s repeated nuclear threats, Biden appears to have overcome the hesitation that delayed such support for so long. This belated action might have come too late to prevent much of the suffering Ukraine has endured.
Had the U.S. shown this resolve sooner, the conflict might have ended earlier, sparing Ukraine significant loss and destruction. Dov S. Zakheim, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, previously served as the undersecretary of Defense for comptroller and chief financial officer from 2001 to 2004.
